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Abstract The interactive ArgTrust application is a decision-making tool that
is based on an underlying formal system of argumentation in which the evi-
dence that influences a recommendation, or conclusion, is modulated according
to values of trust that the user places in that evidence. This paper presents
the design and analysis of a user study which was intended to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of ArgTrust in a collaborative human-agent decision-making task.
The results show that users’ interactions with ArgTrust helped them consider
their decisions more carefully than without using the software tool.
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1 Introduction
Argumentation [61] is an approach to reasoning in which the focus is not just
on the conclusions that are reached, but also on the data from which the
conclusions are inferred, and the inference steps involved. Argumentation has
technical advantages over other logic-based approaches to reasoning, particu-
larly in its ability to handle inconsistent information, but also seems to be a
mechanism that fits well with the way that human reasoning is carried out.
For example, Mercier and Sperber [45] argue that the formation of reasons
for and against conclusions is a fundamental part of human reasoning, while
Walton and Krabbe [76] cast a large part of human interaction in the form of
argumentation-based dialogue.
Argumentation has a long history in artificial intelligence (AI), going back
at least as far as 1980 [9], and has a significant, if shorter, history in agent-
based systems. As early as the 1990’s [40, 67], argumentation was suggested as
a mechanism to extend negotiation between agents from the simple exchange
of offers to a process that allows one agent to persuade another to change its
position. This led to work on argumentation to underpin joint planning [53]1,
and then more general approaches to argumentation-based dialogue that could
capture a range of dialogue types [5, 56, 58, 59]. In work on negotiation be-
tween autonomous agents, the assumption was that the use of argumentation
would lead to agreements that could not be reached by other means, and this
was empirically verified by [57]. Subsequent work has shown that argumen-
tation also has advantages in other forms of dialogue between autonomous
agents [16, 39]. Given the fact that argumentation appears to be a natural
way for humans to reason, and that fact that argumentation is beneficial in
agent-agent interactions, an obvious question is: what is the effect of using
argumentation in human-agent interactions? That is the question on which
we focus in this paper.
This is not the first paper to examine matters related to this question. For
example see the papers in [38]. However, this paper looks at the use of argumen-
tation in human-agent interaction in a novel context: one in which the human
and agent reason collaboratively, using argumentation as the medium through
which they represent their beliefs and thought processes. The “agent” in the
system described here employs formal argumentation for reasoning about a
scenario, and the human is given the same scenario. The agent presents its
conclusions and relevant evidence (i.e., its arguments) to the user, who can
indicate his/her level of agreement with the agent’s beliefs. In the version of
the system presented here, there is no dialogue about their beliefs; though
future work will explore such further levels of interactivity.
In systems of argumentation in which arguments are constructed from logi-
cal statements [4, 8, 19, 46], an important feature is the way in which elements
of the arguments—the premises and rules from which they are constructed—
have a bearing on the quality of the arguments. Premises may be undermined
1 Called “negotiation” in [53], but much closer to what [76] calls “deliberation”.
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and hence defeated. Conclusions may be rebutted, and rules themselves may
be undercut. This relationship between the parts and the whole, combined
with the relationship between the trust individuals place in information and
the provenance of that information [21], led us to suggest the use of argumen-
tation in situations where trust in information is critical [52, 55]. The key idea
is that since argumentation tracks the data used in deriving conclusions, if
that data could be related to the sources from which it comes, information
about those sources could be used in reasoning about the conclusions.
We developed a formal argumentation system [68] that allows informa-
tion about sources—represented in the form of the “trust networks” that are
standard in the literature of reasoning about trust—to be combined with ar-
guments. This formal system was initially implemented in an inference engine
called ArgTrust [54]. The version of ArgTrust evaluated here is intended as
a prototype for an intelligent interactive agent that can collaborate with a
user in making decisions that involve complex situations involving the anal-
ysis of data from a range of sources, not all of which can be fully trusted,
and which change continuously. In the work presented here, we report on a
user study designed to explore how effective ArgTrust is in supporting human
decision-making and, since ArgTrust interacts with the human by providing
arguments, how effective argumentation is for human-agent communication.
In particular, the aim of the user study was to gather information about how
people reason, how they make decisions in uncertain situations, and how they
explain their decisions. Participants (i.e., human subjects) used ArgTrust to
help them visualise a scenario and make sense of information presented that
describes elements of the scenario in different ways.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2
with a brief description of the ArgTrust system, and pointers to papers in
which the reader can obtain more detail. Then, Section 3 describes the design
of the user study, giving full details of the materials given to participants in
the study. Section 4 gives the results of the study. Related work is highlighted
in Section 5, and then Section 6 concludes.
2 ArgTrust
This section briefly describes ArgTrust and the underlying formal model.
2.1 Theoretical basis
The formal argumentation system [68] that underpins ArgTrust starts with the
idea that we want to represent the beliefs of a set of individuals, Ags, where
each Agi ∈ Ags has access to a knowledge base, ∆i, containing formulae in
some language L. An argument is then:
Definition 1 (Argument) An argument A from a knowledge base ∆i ⊆ L
is a pair (G, p) where p is a formula of L and G ⊆ ∆i such that:
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Fig. 1 Social network. Trust is propagated using TidalTrust (see text).
1. G is consistent;
2. G ` p; and
3. G is minimal, so there is no proper subset of G that satisfies the previous
conditions.
G is called the grounds of A, written G = Grounds(A) and p is the conclusion
of A, written p = Conclusion(A). Any g ∈ G is called a premise of A. The key
aspect of argumentation is the association of the grounds with the conclusion,
in particular the fact that we can trace conclusions to the source of the grounds.
The particular language L we use is the language of defeasible Horn clauses—
that is, a language in which formulae are either atomic propositions pi or
formulae of the form pi ∧ . . . ∧ pn ⇒ c, where ⇒ is a defeasible rule rather
than material implication. Inference in this system is by a defeasible form of
generalised modus ponens (DGMP):
p1, . . . , pn pi ∧ . . . ∧ pn ⇒ c
c (1)
and if p follows from a set of formulae G using this inference rule alone, we de-
note this by G ` p. Given its use of defeasible Horn cluases, this argumentation
system is related to that of [19].
The set of individuals, Ags, are related to each other by a social net-
work that includes estimates of how much individual agents trust their ac-
quaintances, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nodes represent individuals and links
between them are annotated with the degree to which one individual trusts an-
other, represented as values between 0 and 1. The input to the network (i.e.,
information known a priori) consists of the nodes and the solid edges. The
output of the network (dashed edges) is the degree of trust inferred between
any two nodes in the network. We can, for example, apply TidalTrust [20]
to propagate trust values through the network and relate agents that are not
directly connected in the social network.
In decision-making situations, argumentation can help in two ways. First,
it is typical that from the data a given individual Agi has about a situation,
we can construct a set of arguments that may conflict with each other. We
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might have an argument (G, p) in favour of some decision option, and another
argument (G′,¬p) against it (in this case, we say that the arguments rebut
each other). We might also have a third argument (G′′,¬g) where g ∈ G is
one of the grounds of the first argument (in this case we say that (G′′,¬g)
undermines (G, p)). Finally, we might have a fourth argument (G′′′,¬i) where
i is one of the conclusions to one of the defeasible rules in (G, p). (This is
another form of rebut, rebuttal of a sub-argument.) Argumentation provides a
principled way—or rather a number of alternative ways—for Agi to establish
which of a conflicting set of arguments it is most reasonable to accept [7].
Second, the grounds of an argument G, can be related back to the sources of
the information that constitutes the grounds. If that information comes from
some individual Agj that Agi knows, then Agi will believe the information
according to how much they trust Agj (an extension of Liau’s [43] principle
that you believe information from individuals that you trust). The same prin-
ciple can be applied to other sources of information2. This weight can be used
to resolve conflicts between arguments. It is possible to provide the decision
maker with links between information that feeds into a decision and the source
of that information, allowing them to explore the effect of trusting particular
sources.
To see more concretely how this can be useful, let’s look at a simple
decision-making example, loosely based on Operation Anaconda [48] and de-
picted in Figure 2. In this example, a decision is being made about whether to
carry out an operation in which a combat team will move into a mountainous
region to try to apprehend a high value target (hvt) believed to be in a village
in the mountains.
We have the following information:
1. If there are enemy fighters in the area, then an hvt is likely to be in the
area.
2 For example, military intelligence traditionally separates information into that which
comes from human sources, that which comes from signals intercepts, and that which comes
from imagery. All of these sources can be rated with some measure of trustworthiness.
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2. If there is an hvt in the area, and the mission will be safe, then the mission
should go ahead.
3. If the number of enemy fighters in the area is too large, the mission will
not be safe.
4. uavs that have flown over the area have provided images that appear to
show the presence of a significant number of camp fires, indicating the
presence of enemy fighters.
5. The quality of the images from the uavs is not very good, so they are not
very trusted.
6. A reconnaissance (“recon”) team that infiltrated the area saw a large num-
ber of vehicles in the village that the hvt is thought to be inhabiting.
7. Since enemy fighters invariably use vehicles to move around, this is evidence
for the presence of many enemy fighters.
8. Informants near the combat team base claim that they have been to the
area in question and that a large number of fighters are present.
9. In addition, we have the default assumption that missions will be safe,
because in the absence of information to the contrary we believe that the
combat team will be safe.
Thus there is evidence from uav imaging that sufficient enemy are in the
right location to suggest the presence of an hvt. There is also some evidence
from informants that there are too many enemy fighters in the area for the
mission to be safe.
We might represent this information as follows (the numbers in parentheses
indicate the correspondence between the logic representations, below, and the
relevant piece(s) of information, above)3:
(1) InArea(enemy)⇒ HV T
(2) HV T ∧ Safe(mission)⇒ Proceed(mission)
(3) InArea(enemy) ∧Many(enemy)⇒ ¬Safe(mission)
(4, 5) InArea(campfires)
(4) InArea(campfires)⇒ InArea(enemy)
(6) InArea(vehicles)
(7) InArea(vehicles)⇒ Many(enemy)
(7, 8) Many(enemy)
(9) Safe(mission)
3 While stressing that this is purely illustrative — a real model of this example would be
considerably more detailed.
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From this information, we can construct arguments such as:

InArea(campfires),
InArea(campfires)⇒ InArea(enemy),
InArea(enemy) ∧ Safe(mission)⇒ HV T,
Safe(mission),
HV T ⇒ Proceed(mission)
 , P roceed(mission)

which is an argument for the mission proceeding, based on the fact that there
are campfires in the area, which suggest enemy fighters, that enemy fighters
suggest the presence of an hvt, and that the presence of an hvt (along with
the default assumption that the mission will be safe) suggests that the mission
should go ahead. The level of belief in this argument will depend on the trust
in the source of the information from which the argument is constructed.
Since the crucial information in the argument, the presence of the campfires,
is derived from the uav imaging, trust in the uav imaging will determine the
belief in the argument.
We can build other arguments from the available information, and, since
these will conflict, then compute a subset that are acceptable. (Approaches to
this computation are discussed in [7].) In this case, we can use information
from the informants to build an argument that there are many enemies in the
area and hence the mission will not be safe:

InArea(vehicles),
InArea(enemy),
InArea(vehicles)⇒Many(enemy)
InArea(enemy)
∧Many(enemy)⇒ ¬Safe(mission)
 ,¬Safe(mission)

This conflicts with the previous argument by undermining the assumption
about the mission being safe. The belief in this second argument will depend,
again, on the trust in the sources of the information from which the argument
is constructed. In this case, the crucial information is that from the infor-
mants. Since information from informants is trusted less than that from the
uav4, the level of belief in this second argument will be less than that in the
first argument. Following [3], we use the degree of belief in an argument to
determine which arguments are defeated, and in this case the first argument
is not defeated by the second. This, in turn means that the first argument is
acceptable.
The relation between trust in the source of an argument, defeat between
arguments and the computation of acceptability is explored in more detail in
in [55].
4 In this scenario, because informants are paid for useful information, they are widely
considered to simply make up plausible information with the result that it is considered to
be untrustworthy, and certainly less trustworthy than information derived from the high-
resolution imaging from a uav.
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2.2 Implementation
An initial version (v1.0) of ArgTrust was described in [69]. Here we present
some aspects of a more recent version, v2.0, which was used for the user study.
Like v1.0, this current version takes as input an xml file in a format which we
sketch here. First, we have a specification of how much sources of information
are trusted, for example:
<t rus tne t>
<agent> recon </agent>
. . .
<t rus t>
<t r u s t e r> me </t ru s t e r>
<t ru s t e e> recon </t rus t e e>
< l e v e l> 0 .95 </ l e v e l>
</t rus t>
. . .
</t rus tne t>
which specifies the individuals involved (including “me”, the decision maker)
and the trust relationships between them, including the level of trust (specified
as a number between 0 (no trust) and 1 (completely trustworthy)). The current
implementation uses these values to compute the trust that one agent places on
another using a choice of TidalTrust [20] or the mechanism described in [78].
The xml file also contains the specification of each individual’s knowledge,
for example:
<b e l i e f b a s e>
<b e l i e f >
<agent> recon </agent>
<f ac t> enemy in area </fac t>
< l e v e l> 0 .9 </ l e v e l>
</ b e l i e f >
. . .
<b e l i e f >
<agent> me </agent>
<ru le>
<premise> many enemy </premise>
<conc lus ion> not s a f e </conc lus ion>
</ru le>
< l e v e l> 1 .0 </ l e v e l>
</ b e l i e f >
. . .
</b e l i e f b a s e>
Here the numbers reflect the belief each individual has in its information about
the world.
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From this data, and a query about a particular proposition, ArgTrust con-
structs arguments for that proposition by backward chaining. Once these ar-
guments have been constructed, ArgTrust examines each formula used in the
derivation of these arguments to identify if there are arguments with conclu-
sions that attack these formulae. Each formula in those attacking arguments
are then examined in turn. (And so on.) Once the full set of arguments is con-
structed, trust and belief are used to establish which arguments are defeated
(as sketched above), and the grounded semantics [12]5 are applied to establish
acceptability, and the conclusions labelled in, out or undec [7].
ArgTrust v2.0 extends the previous version [70, 68] by implementing a
more robust and flexible data model. ArgTrust v2.0 uses a mysql database
and the Python programming language (for reasons outlined below), in place
of Java (which was employed for ArgTrust v1.0). The language choice was
largely made in order to simplify the recursive methods for storing the data
and traversing it in different ways and because it was desirable to develop an
interactive front-end that could be executed in a standard web browser. In a
mysql6 database, we maintain arguments as a set of trees that represent the
logical steps needed to arrive at the argument’s conclusion. Thus, to return to
our Operation Anaconda example, the combination of premise
InArea(campfires)
with rule
InArea(campfires)⇒ InArea(enemy)
to infer conclusion
InArea(enemy)
would be represented as a tree in which each of the above formulae was a node,
and arcs led from premise to rule to conclusion. The representation allows us
to easily overlap arguments that share predicates or rules. Thus, if we had
another argument with conclusion InArea(enemy), we would represent the
two arguments together as a tree with a single conclusion node.
Another important piece of the data model is its flexibility to receive new
attributes and easily facilitate reconstructing arguments for the conclusions at
hand. For example, our experience is that users each have different senses of
what “very trustworthy” means. Therefore, we built the system in such a way
that changing values to belief levels or trust levels does not require completely
reloading the scenario, instead entails just changing a parameter value.
The underlying ArgTrust inference engine can be invoked in four different
modes: (1) as a command-line tool; (2) as a visualisation tool; (3) as an interac-
tive decision support agent (the mode evaluated here); and (4) as a back-end
reasoning engine. In command-line tool mode, a user can load an xml file,
modify its contents on the ArgTrust command line, and pose queries to the
5 The latest version of ArgTrust at the time of writing implements all the common se-
mantics.
6 http://www.mysql.com
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Fig. 3 ArgTrust screen: A high-level view of the argument graph
inference engine. The system responds by outputting text that reports the sta-
tus of arguments supporting the query. In visualisation tool mode, the system
produces output in a graphical display of the resulting arguments—here the
result of inference is an argument graph (see below) like that in Figure 3. In
interactive agent mode, users collaboratively step through a decision scenario
and analyse it interactively, with help from the agent. In back-end reasoning
engine mode, ArgTrust is called by another program—which might itself have
an interactive front-end. Input is in the form of an xml file, as with the pre-
vious three modes; and output is also presented in the form of an xml file,
where the burden of communicating the content of the output to a human user
becomes the responsibility of the calling program. An example of this mode
has been implemented and tested in related work involving a human-robot
environment [6].
In visualisation and interactive agent modes, ArgTrust makes use of argu-
ment graphs to visualise complex scenarios and assign probabilities to all the
possible outcomes. These graphs, which are distinct from the attack graphs
common in the literature (also often called “argument graphs”7), represent
the relationship between the facts and rules that make up the arguments, and
the relationships between the arguments themselves. A full explanation of the
7 See, for example, Figure 1 in [75].
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Fig. 4 ArgTrust screen: A more focussed view of one argument for the mission being unsafe
graphs can be found in [68], along with the translation into graph-theoretic
terms of the usual ideas of extension and the acceptability of arguments.
The next section, below, describes the user interface developed for the
interactive decision support mode. Then, Sections 3 and 4 describe a user
study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of this mode.
2.3 User interface
The interactive decision support mode of ArgTrust v2.0 includes an interface
which allows users to manipulate the argument graphs at different levels of
detail, and to focus on individual components of an argument, in order to
better understand a scenario in its entirety and reach an informed conclusion.
This mode was developed for the user study, and is intended to be used in
a context where both the text of a narrative describing an scenario and the
arguments describing a scenario are both to be presented to a test subject.
When used in this mode, there are four main components to the ArgTrust
interface, each accessed by clicking on the following tabs in the user interface:
– Review Scenario: This component shows the text-based narrative de-
scribing a scenario and allows users to read through it before progressing.
This tab is persistent, allowing users to revisit the scenario text at any
time.
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– Review Trust/Beliefs/Rules: These three tabs allow a user to change
the belief level for any belief or rule, and the levels of trust in individual
agents. The corresponding sentence in the scenario is displayed as well,
facilitating the user’s ability to set the level more accurately. After setting
a belief level, the user can navigate to one of the last two tabs to see
how it impacts the argument. This process can be iterative, as the user
understands and learns their own process for defining belief and trust levels.
– Trust+Beliefs: In this part of the system, the combination of an agent’s
trust values and belief values are displayed to illustrate the belief value
for the decision maker in a particular proposition. The goal is to fill the
logical gap between setting trust values and belief values by displaying the
combination of both.
– Argument Graph: This component displays the argument graph that
corresponds to the scenario. Scenarios are broken down into arguments
which are built from bits of knowledge (e.g., facts or evidence), rules (or
beliefs), and the resulting conclusions. Facts and rules are linked to indi-
viduals (sources of information or agents). Arrows connect facts, rules and
conclusions together to form a chain. A chain is referred to as an argument.
(A chain can have only one arrow linking two nodes, or multiple arrows
linking more than two nodes.) Each argument ends in a conclusion, and
every conclusion is assigned a belief. The user can control the amount of
information displayed in the graph by selecting “zoom level” and “detail”
options and “focus”.
—Zoom-level and Detail-level controls: Located in the upper right-hand
corner of the argument graph panel are the zoom and detail controls. The
zoom buttons allow users to visually zoom in and out of the graph (i.e.,
magnifying the visual display, but not changing the content). The detail
slider allows users to adjust the level of detail displayed in the graph (i.e.,
changing the content to be more refined or more abstract). At the highest
level of detail (most abstract), only the conclusions and their correspond-
ing beliefs are displayed. Alternatively, at the lowest level of detail (most
refined), all sources, i.e., agents, beliefs, facts, rules are shown.
—Focus controls: The focus feature, located in the sidebar, enables users to
focus on individual arguments of a graph. The graph updates to highlight
the chosen conclusion or piece of knowledge, allowing users to focus in on
that particular piece of the scenario.
3 User study design
We conducted a user study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the ArgTrust
interactive decision support mode. A primary goal of the study was to provide
a preliminary assessment of the impact of ArgTrust on users’ decision-making
processes. Two scenarios were developed for the user study, including narra-
tives and logical representations of information contained in each narrative,
such as in the example outlined in Section 2.1. One scenario is short, relatively
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simple and was created as a training exercise; the other scenario is longer, more
complex and was built as an evaluation exercise.
The user study procedure involved multiple steps. First, participants were
asked to provide demographic (e.g., gender and age) and background informa-
tion (e.g., education, level of experience working with computers and decision-
making tools) by filling out a Pre-survey. These data were collected for sta-
tistical purposes in order to describe the population of human subjects and
to satisfy reporting requirements of funding agencies. Then participants com-
pleted a short training exercise, using the short and simple scenario mentioned
above and shown in Figure 5, to familiarise them with a formal notion of de-
cision making under uncertainty and to give them a preliminary experience
using ArgTrust.
Your grandparents are coming to visit you in New York City, and they are arriving at
the airport shortly. They get anxious when visiting big cities, so you promised to meet
them at the airport and escort them to their hotel. You had planned to take the train
to the airport straight from work. Right before you planned to leave, your co-worker
tells you there was an earlier incident at a station and that train line is experiencing
delays. You text a friend, who you know lives near that train line, to confirm. Your friend
tells you that she left her house at the usual time and arrived to work on time, without
experiencing any problems with the train. Do you risk taking the train, which may be
delayed, or do you take a taxi instead (more expensive, but quicker)?
Fig. 5 Narrative of short, simple training scenario: “Grandparents Scenario”
Next, participants were presented with a text-based narrative describing
a more complex scenario (the longer scenario, mentioned above and shown in
Figure 6). They were asked to analyse the details of the scenario and come to
a decision about an action to take with respect to the scenario. Some of the
questions required users to simply repeat information given in the scenario;
this was intentional, to ensure that users had carefully read and understood
the text. Once they made their decision, they were then asked to report on why
and how they made that decision, via an on-line Mid-survey. Participants were
asked to provide as much detail as possible regarding their thought processes.
Finally, participants were given the same scenario and asked to reconsider
their decision, this time with the aid of ArgTrust. The input to ArgTrust was
an xml file with contents that we extracted manually from the scenario in
Figure 6. Participants were asked to employ the user interface to interact with
ArgTrust and explore the data describing the scenario, and then report on how
they utilised the software in their decision-making process, by completing an
on-line Post-survey. The study took approximately 60 minutes to complete.
We make a few comments on the design of the user study. First, it is likely
that a learning effect took place between the Mid-survey and Post-survey, be-
cause participants answered questions about the same scenario in both surveys.
A different study design might have had users explore two different scenarios:
one for the Mid-survey (without using ArgTrust) and one for the Post-survey
(after using ArgTrust). This might control better for learning effect, with re-
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A week ago, a powerful earthquake struck Brax causing widespread devastation to the
country’s infrastructure and leaving over 10,000 dead and over 50,000 injured. The two
cities in Brax that were hit the hardest are Waga and Tapel. The Braxian Government
and the UN have requested global assistance to launch the largest humanitarian relief
operation ever executed. The Braxian Military, with its extensive and modern military
force and airlift capability, is leading the effort and coordinating the international re-
sponse. You are an Intelligence Analyst at your desk in the Operations Center of the
main Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Tapel, monitoring the flow of data and reports
coming in related to conditions, casualties and relief requirements. You have direct com-
munications with the other FOB location in Waga, which was likewise affected by the
earthquake. There are two rebel insurgent cells operating in the region: Reds and Lions.
Each one is vying for power with the population, local and national politicians. Each
one is seeking to take advantage of the situation to consolidate their political positions
and establish local control with their rebel militia forces. The rebel militia forces have
access to only small arms weapons and limited explosives. The rebel militias are stir-
ring up the local population to protest the incompetence of the Braxian government.
Braxian military forces are now stretched thin, trying to defend against the rebel militia
forces while, at the same time, leading humanitarian rescue efforts in the wake of the
earthquake. It has been 6 days since the earthquake hit Brax. Your Army Commander
has asked you to answer the following Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR): Which
rebel militia cell is encouraging the most violence against the Braxian government? You
have the following information (the order of the items listed is arbitrary):
– The Braxian Military reports that they have encountered many attacks/incidents
of violence involving Red rebels and only some incidents of violence involving Lion
rebels.
– Many incidents of violence by a rebel group imply that it is creating/encouraging
much violence whereas some incidents of violence by a rebel group imply that it is
not creating much violence.
– Sources of information include: Braxian Department of State, Braxian First Re-
sponders, Braxian Officials, Braxian Civilians, International Civilians and Open Me-
dia (like newspapers). Collectively, these sources of information reports only few
incidents each, which makes information from them incomplete.
– Twitter feeds are inundated with reports of violence which are often contradictory.
Twitter feeds are not considered very reliable.
– The Braxian Military reconnaissance reports that they have seen lots of vehicles
outside the Lion Headquarters both in Tapel and in Waga.
– The presence of large number of vehicles outside a rebel militia headquarters can
indicate that the rebel militia is planning many attacks/incidents of violence on
relief personnel.
– Members of the rebel Lion militia who are paid by the Braxian government to inform
on their comrades indicate that they have been directed to increase violence and
use small arms against the Braxian military.
– A rebel group that may be planning many attacks as well as directing its members
to increase violence could be a group that will create much violence.
You have to decide which rebel militia the Braxian Military efforts should focus on
defending against.
Fig. 6 Narrative of longer, more complex evaluation scenario: “Humanitarian Relief Sce-
nario”
spect to participants’ knowledge of the scenario (though not with respect to
participants’ knowledge of the software tool). Second, a further study design
might attempt to control for order effect : half of the participants work without
ArgTrust to answer questions about the first scenario and with ArgTrust to
answer questions about a second scenario; and the other half of the partici-
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pants use ArgTrust to answer questions about the first scenario and without
the software for the second scenario. This might control for participants liking
the software tool better because they work with it after struggling without it,
or vice versa. Future studies will consider other designs such as these.
4 User study results
The user study was conducted in three sessions, where each session was con-
ducted in a different location and involved a different set of participants. This
division occurred purely due to logistics with regard to scheduling multiple
sessions in which to accommodate sufficient numbers of participants. How-
ever, as mentioned below, the three groupings led to interesting distinctions
with respect to the analysis of the results. Group I consisted of psychol-
ogy undergraduate and graduate students, and the session was conducted in
a university computer lab setting. Group II consisted of computer science
undergraduate and graduate students, and the session was conducted in a
university computer lab setting. Group III consisted of technical employees
of an engineering research company, and the session was conducted in a cor-
porate conference room. Each session followed the same procedure (outlined
in Section 3), although the first group did not complete the Mid-survey (due
to unforeseen logistical problems that occurred during the session).
This section discusses the results obtained by the three surveys (Pre-survey,
Mid-survey and Post-survey), followed by comparative analysis across the
surveys, especially the relationships between answers on the Pre- and Post-
surveys, and on the Mid- and Post-surveys. Questions from the Mid-survey
and Post-survey are analysed in four categories: A. questions about facts (i.e.,
reading comprehension and paying attention to misleading questions); B. ques-
tions about applying rules found in the scenario; C. questions about trust of
information sources; and D. questions about conclusions drawn from the in-
formation provided in the scenario.
4.1 Pre-survey
Twenty-two (22) participants completed the user study. Basic demographics
are shown in Table 1. All participants were well-educated: 12 participants had
a Masters Degree or above, and 8 had a PhD. Nobody reported previous expe-
rience with computer-based decision making tools, but almost everyone (21 of
22) claimed prior experience with data management tools, such as Microsoft
Excel (20 out of 22). Only 2 of the 22 participants indicated on the Pre-survey
that they had previously encountered the concepts of “logical argumentation”
or “argumentation graphs”.
We collected the demographic data with two hypotheses in mind. The
first hypothesis was that people whose education and experience was non-
technical (versus technical) would find ArgTrust harder to work with. The
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gender age
group count female male 18-24 25-39
everyone 22 (100%) 9 (41%) 13 (59%) 6 (27%) 16 (73%)
Group I 6 (27%) 6 (100%) 0 (0%) 2 (33%) 4 (67%)
Group II 7 (32%) 1 (14%) 6 (86%) 4 (57%) 3 (43%)
Group III 9 (41%) 2 (22%) 7 (78%) 0 (0%) 9 (100%)
Tech 12 (55%) 2 (17%) 10 (83%) 2 (17%) 10 (83%)
Non-Tech 10 (45%) 7 (70%) 3 (30%) 4 (40%) 6 (60%)
English 17 (77%) 7 (41%) 10 (59%) 5 (29%) 12 (71%)
Non-English 5 (23%) 2 (40%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 4 (80%)
ethnicity
group Asian Black Latino White
everyone 7 (32%) 1 (5%) 2 (9%) 12 (55%)
Group I 2 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (67%)
Group II 3 (43%) 1 (14%) 1 (14%) 2 (29%)
Group III 2 (22%) 0 (0%) 1 (11%) 6 (67%)
Tech 4 (33%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 7 (58%)
Non-Tech 3 (30%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 5 (50%)
English 4 (24%) 1 (6%) 2 (12%) 10 (59%)
Non-English 3 (60%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (40%)
academic major native language
group Tech Non-Tech English Non-English
everyone 12 (55%) 10 (45%) 17 (77%) 5 (23%)
Group I 0 (0%) 6 (100%) 4 (67%) 2 (33%)
Group II 3 (43%) 4 (57%) 5 (71%) 2 (29%)
Group III 9 (100%) 0 (0%) 8 (89%) 1 (11%)
Tech 12 (100%) 0 (0%) 9 (75%) 3 (25%)
Non-Tech 0 (0%) 10 (100%) 8 (80%) 2 (20%)
English 9 (53%) 8 (47%) 17 (100%) 0 (0%)
Non-English 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%)
Table 1 User study participants. There were 22 human subjects in total. The table shows
participants broken down into study session, undergraduate major subject and native lan-
guage groups.
second hypothesis was that people who were non-native (versus native) English
speakers would find ArgTrust more helpful for understanding the subtleties in
the narrative (which was presented in English). Table 1 tallies the number of
participants in each session group who majored as undergraduates in Technical
subjects (Computer Science, Information Technology or Engineering), as well
as the number of participants who are native English speakers (at least, who
speak English at home). As will be discussed below, our analysis of the results
collected in the study indicates that these are relevant groupings of participants
for highlighting differences in the impact and effectiveness of interacting with
ArgTrust for making decisions.
Our first hypothesis when designing the study was that people who had
no particular experience in technical subjects would find ArgTrust harder to
learn how to work with, but more useful, as compared to people who had been
trained in technical subjects such as Computer Science, Information Technol-
ogy and/or Engineering. So we asked for participants to include information
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on the pre-survey about their favourite subject(s) when they were in high
school and the academic subject they majored in as college undergraduates.
The results showed that 12 (55%) of all participants in the study majored as
undergraduates in Computer Science, Information Technology and/or Engi-
neering; thus, the analysis (below) considers the participants grouped accord-
ing to Technical majors and Non-Technical majors in order to evaluate this
hypothesis.
Our second hypothesis when designing the study was that people who were
non-native English speakers would find ArgTrust helpful in constructing rea-
soning that involved subtleties of the language used in the narrative (English).
So we asked participants to include information on the pre-survey about the
language that they speak at home (“What language(s) do you and your parents
speak at home?”). Although 17 (77%) of participants speak English at home,
many of the participants also speak another language; in fact, 15 (68%) of
participants speak languages other than English at home. Overall, 7 (32%)
people indicated that they live in bi-lingual households, and one person indi-
cated that they speak four languages at home. The analysis (below) considers
the participants grouped according to English speaking and Non-English
speaking homes in order to evaluate this hypothesis.
We also asked participants about computer usage in the Pre-survey, in
order to whether their level of familiarity with technology. The results are
shown in Table 2. These indicate that all members of the cohort involved
in the study were quite familiar with computers and technology in general,
regardless of whether they had studied a technical subject as an undergraduate
and regardless of their native language. Use of social media was more varied
across the cohort. As a result, the analysis that follows does not attempt to
derive any correlations between computer usage habits and results with respect
to understanding of the test scenario or ease-of-use interacting with ArgTrust.
4.2 Mid-survey
The Mid-survey was designed to reflect users’ understanding of the scenario
after only reading the text narrative (i.e., before interacting with ArgTrust).
Some sample questions are discussed here. Note that the participants from
Group I did not complete the Mid-survey, due to logistical issues when the
study was administered at that site, so only 16 participants (Groups II and
III) completed the Mid-survey. Percentages reported in this section are thus
computed out of 16 instead of 22 users.
Users responded to six multiple choice questions (with possible answers of
TRUE, FALSE and Inconclusive), followed by an indication of their confidence
in their answer, ranging from 1 (least confident) to 10 (most confident). Users
also responded to questions about their trust in the informants depicted in
the scenario and the likelihood that an intermediate conclusion drawn from
some evidence provided in the scenario is valid. Finally, users responded to
the ultimate question posed in the scenario narrative:
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several at least several
times once times
group per day per day per week infrequently never
How often do you use a computer? (i.e., laptop or desktop)
everyone 20 (91%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Group I 4 (67%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Group II 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Group III 9 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Tech 12 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Non-Tech 8 (80%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
English 15 (88%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Non-English 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
How often do you use a computer-based device? (other than a laptop or desktop)
everyone 20 (91%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Group I 6 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Group II 6 (86%) 1 (14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Group III 8 (89%) 0 (0%) 1 (11%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Tech 11 (92%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Non-Tech 9 (90%) 1 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
English 15 (88%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Non-English 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
How often do you use social media? (e.g., Facebook, Twitter)
everyone 6 (27%) 2 (9%) 6 (27%) 7 (32%) 1 (5%)
Group I 2 (33%) 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%)
Group II 3 (43%) 1 (14%) 1 (14%) 2 (29%) 0 (0%)
Group III 1 (11%) 0 (0%) 3 (33%) 5 (56%) 0 (0%)
Tech 2 (17%) 1 (8%) 3 (25%) 6 (50%) 0 (0%)
Non-Tech 4 (40%) 1 (10%) 3 (30%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%)
English 5 (29%) 1 (6%) 5 (29%) 5 (29%) 1 (6%)
Non-English 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%)
Table 2 Participants’ computer usage habits.
You have to decide which rebel militia the Braxian Military efforts should
focus on defending against.
along with their confidence in their answer.
A. Mid-Survey Questions about Facts
The multiple choice questions were designed to determine how carefully the
users read the narrative text and how well they understood the scenario.
Specifically, we are looking for whether users extracted facts (or evidence,
to use the argumentation terminology) and implications associated with the
facts (or rules, again using the argumentation terminology). Table 3 tallies the
responses to Mid-survey questions about facts presented in the scenario.
In answer to the question:
The Red rebel militia is operating in the area devastated by an earthquake.
none of the users answered FALSE. Only just over half felt confident with a
TRUE answer (63%) and the rest were unable to reach a conclusion (38%).
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Close examination of the narrative produces two sentences that clearly relate
to this question:
A week ago, a powerful earthquake struck Brax...
There are two rebel insurgent cells operating in the region: Reds and Lions.
But there is indeed ambiguity with respect to the phrase “in the region”—does
“region” refer to the same area where the earthquake has occurred?
In contrast, in response to question:
Many vehicles have been seen near Lion headquarters in Waga.
all the users answered TRUE, and their confidence was high (9.06). Referring
back to the narrative, one of the bulleted items states:
– The Braxian Military reconnaissance reports that they have seen lots
of vehicles outside the Lion Headquarters both in Tapel and in Waga.
The unanimous consensus could stem from two reasons: first, readers tend to
pay more attention to details that are enumerated in lists; and second, users
trusted the Braxian Military as the source of this information more than other
sources (such as informants).
The first reason (readers pay attention to details presented in lists) is
backed up by the results shown in response to the question:
Twitter feeds are unreliable sources of information.
The following excerpt from the narrative provides evidence for the answer:
– Twitter feeds are inundated with reports of violence which are often
contradictory. Twitter feeds are not considered very reliable.
Here, most users provided a TRUE answer (75%), though a few could not draw
a conclusion. One participant answered FALSE, which we could interpret as
an indication that that person did not read the narrative carefully or fully
comprehend the details; however, this person also indicated in the Pre-survey
that they used social media several times a day, which may bias his/her answer.
Note that there were other participants who also indicated that they use social
media several times a day but still answered TRUE to this question about the
unreliability of Twitter.
Some questions were designed to be misleading with respect to the facts
presented in the scenario. Consider the statement from the Mid-survey:
Vehicles belonging to the Tiger rebel militia have been seen near the Brax-
ian Military headquarters.
This statement indicates a group called “Tiger”, which does not exist in the sce-
nario and was included as a contrast to the previous question which asks about
“Lion”—attempting to highlight whether users confused the names “Lion” and
“Tiger”. More than half the users entered FALSE (63%), indicating that most
were paying attention, one user entered TRUE, indicating that they were not
paying attention; as well, a non-trivial number of users (5) thought the in-
formation was Inconclusive. This could either be because they didn’t read the
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group TRUE FALSE Inconclusive confidence
The Red rebel militia is operating in the area devastated by an earthquake.
everyone 10 (63%) 0 (0%) 6 (38%) 8.12 (1.63)
Group II 5 (71%) 0 (0%) 2 (29%) 7.57
Group III 5 (56%) 0 (0%) 4 (44%) 8.56
Tech 7 (58%) 0 (0%) 5 (42%) 8.08
Non-Tech 3 (75%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 8.25
English 8 (62%) 0 (0%) 5 (38%) 8.31
Non-English 2 (67%) 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 7.33
Many vehicles have been seen near Lion headquarters in Waga.
everyone 16 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9.06 (0.93)
Group II 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9.57
Group III 9 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8.67
Tech 12 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8.83
Non-Tech 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9.75
English 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9.00
Non-English 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9.33
Twitter feeds are unreliable sources of information.
everyone 12 (75%) 1 (6%) 3 (19%) 8.12 (1.78)
Group II 5 (71%) 1 (14%) 1 (14%) 8.86
Group III 7 (78%) 0 (0%) 2 (22%) 7.56
Tech 9 (75%) 0 (0%) 3 (25%) 8.08
Non-Tech 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 8.25
English 9 (69%) 1 (8%) 3 (23%) 8.00
Non-English 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8.67
Vehicles belonging to Tiger rebels have been seen near the Brax Military headquarters.
everyone 1 (6%) 10 (63%) 5 (31%) 9.12 (1.20)
Group II 1 (14%) 4 (57%) 2 (29%) 8.86
Group III 0 (0%) 6 (67%) 3 (33%) 9.33
Tech 0 (0%) 8 (67%) 4 (33%) 9.25
Non-Tech 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 8.75
English 1 (8%) 7 (54%) 5 (38%) 9.00
Non-English 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 9.67
The Lions have access to chemical weapons.
everyone 0 (0%) 7 (44%) 9 (56%) 9.00 (1.10)
Group II 0 (0%) 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 8.86
Group III 0 (0%) 2 (22%) 7 (78%) 9.11
Tech 0 (0%) 5 (42%) 7 (58%) 9.08
Non-Tech 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 8.75
English 0 (0%) 5 (38%) 8 (62%) 9.00
Non-English 0 (0%) 2 (67%) 1 (33%) 9.00
Table 3 Responses to Mid-survey questions about facts. Standard deviation is shown for
averages across all participants (in parentheses).
scenario carefully, or because they thought that there might really be another
rebel group called Tiger, but that the scenario did not provide any conclusive
evidence about the Tiger group.
The statement:
The Lions have access to chemical weapons.
is in clear contraction to the following statement in the narrative:
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The rebel militia forces have access to only small arms weapons and limited
explosives.
Nonetheless, less than half the users (44%) answered FALSE, while the re-
mainder could not draw any conclusion (56%); and confidence overall was
high (9.00).
B. Mid-survey Questions about Applying Rules
One question attempts to measure how well the users applied rules presented
in the scenario:
How likely is it that vehicles outside the Lion militia HQ indicate that the
group is planning an attack?
which puts together this fact:
The Braxian Military reconnaissance reports that they have seen lots of
vehicles outside the Lion Headquarters...
and this rule:
The presence of large number of vehicles outside a rebel militia headquar-
ters can indicate that the rebel militia is planning many attacks...
from the narrative. The results (see Table 4) show that users did not assimilate
this information well from reading the scenario, because the mean answer (and
standard deviation) were 6.75 (1.61), on a scale of 1 (not likely at all) to 10
(very likely).
group average likelihood (1-10)
How likely is it that vehicles outside the Lion militia
headquarters indicate that the group is planning an attack?
everyone 6.75 (1.61)
Group II 7.00
Group III 6.56
Tech 7.00
Non-Tech 6.00
English 6.31
Non-English 8.67
Table 4 Responses to Mid-survey questions about applying rules, ranging from 1 (not likely
at all) to 10 (very likely).
C. Mid-survey Questions about Trust
One question attempts to measure how much users trust sources of informa-
tion:
How much do you trust the paid Lion militia informants?
The mean answer (and standard deviation) were 5.69 (1.66), on a scale of 1
(not much at all) to 10 (very much). Results are tallied in Table 5.
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group average level of trust (1-10)
How much do you trust the paid Lion militia informants?
everyone 5.69 (1.66)
Group II 6.00
Group III 5.44
Tech 5.58
Non-Tech 6.00
English 5.85
Non-English 5.00
Table 5 Responses to Mid-survey questions about trust, ranging from 1 (not much trust)
to 10 (very much).
D. Mid-survey Questions about Conclusions
Finally, one question asks about users’ conclusions with respect to the overall
predicament posed by the narrative:
Which rebel militia is the most violent, implying that Braxian Military
efforts should focus on defending against attacks from that insurgent group
(as opposed to other insurgents)?
The responses are tallied in Table 6. Results are fairly evenly split (44 : 56) be-
tween the two groups (Lions) and (Reds), and confidence is moderate (7.19)—
lower with respect to questions about facts (which averaged 8.7 confidence
measures).
group Lions Reds confidence
Which rebel militia is the most violent?
everyone 7 (44%) 9 (56%) 7.19 (1.17)
Group II 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 7.71
Group III 3 (33%) 6 (67%) 6.78
Tech 5 (42%) 7 (58%) 6.83
Non-Tech 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 8.25
English 5 (38%) 8 (62%) 7.31
Non-English 2 (67%) 1 (33%) 6.67
Table 6 Responses to Mid-survey questions about conclusion drawn.
4.3 Post-survey
The Post-survey is divided into two parts. The first part contains a series
of questions that, like the Mid-survey, are designed to reflect how well the
users understand the scenario and are supported in making decisions with the
information presented. The second part contains a number of questions that
are designed to assess the users’ impressions of ArgTrust, independent from
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the particular scenario. Here, we discuss both parts. Comparative analysis of
answers given in the Post-survey and Mid-survey is deferred to Section 4.3.2.
We begin, next, by presenting the Post-survey responses.
4.3.1 Post-survey, Part 1
The first part of the Post-survey was designed to reflect users’ understanding
of the scenario after interacting with ArgTrust. Some sample questions are
discussed here. Percentages reported in this section are computed out of 22
users, since all users completed the Post-survey.
Similarly to the Mid-survey, users responded to four multiple choice ques-
tions (with possible answers of TRUE, FALSE and Inconclusive), as well as
indicating their confidence in their answer, ranging from 1 (least confident)
to 10 (most confident). Users also responded to questions about their trust in
the informants depicted in the scenario and the likelihood that an intermediate
conclusion drawn from some evidence provided in the scenario is valid. Finally,
users responded to the ultimate question posed in the scenario narrative:
You have to decide which rebel militia the Braxian Military efforts should
focus on defending against.
along with their confidence in their answer.
A. Post-survey Questions about Facts
As with the Mid-survey, the multiple choice questions in the Post-survey were
designed to determine how carefully the users read the narrative text and how
well they understood the scenario, in particular after interacting with ArgTrust
to work with the facts and rules contained in the narrative. The responses are
tallied in Table 7.
The following statement was contained in the Post-survey:
Information from the Braxian Military reconnaissance team indicates that
there are many rebel militia forces in the areas devastated by the earth-
quake.
Evidence supporting this observation is contained in the scenario narrative:
A week ago, a powerful earthquake struck Brax...
There are two rebel insurgent cells operating in the region: Reds and Lions.
which can reasonably derive a TRUE response to the question. As Table 7 in-
dicates, more than half of participants (64%) responded with TRUE. However,
most of the rest (7 people, 32%) were unable to draw a conclusion.
Another Post-survey question:
Vehicles being seen near a rebel headquarters implies that rebels are plan-
ning an attack.
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paraphrases an item from the narrative:
– The presence of large number of vehicles outside a rebel militia head-
quarters can indicate that the rebel militia is planning many attack-
s/incidents of violence on relief personnel.
However, a literal interpretation of the narrative phrase “can indicate” is less
conclusive than the phrasing in the question: “implies”. Perhaps this is why
more users responded to the question with an Inconclusive answer, as shown in
Table 7. Here we note that all hesitation with respect to this fact was reported
by those who speak English at home.
Confidence with respect to questions about facts was lower than the Mid-
survey, 7.78 on average, versus 8.7 average confidence on the Mid-survey.
group TRUE FALSE Inconclusive confidence
Information from the Braxian Military reconnaissance team indicates that there
are many rebel militia forces in the areas devastated by the earthquake.
everyone 14 (64%) 1 (5%) 7 (32%) 7.64 (1.99)
Group I 2 (33%) 1 (17%) 3 (50%) 6.50
Group II 6 (86%) 0 (0%) 1 (14%) 8.14
Group III 6 (67%) 0 (0%) 3 (33%) 8.00
Tech 9 (75%) 0 (0%) 3 (25%) 8.25
Non-Tech 5 (50%) 1 (10%) 4 (40%) 6.90
English 11 (65%) 0 (0%) 6 (35%) 7.88
Non-English 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 6.80
Vehicles being seen near a rebel headquarters implies that rebels are planning an attack.
everyone 10 (45%) 1 (5%) 11 (50%) 7.91 (1.57)
Group I 3 (50%) 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 7.67
Group II 3 (43%) 0 (0%) 4 (57%) 8.57
Group III 4 (44%) 0 (0%) 5 (56%) 7.56
Tech 6 (50%) 0 (0%) 6 (50%) 7.92
Non-Tech 4 (40%) 1 (10%) 5 (50%) 7.90
English 5 (29%) 1 (6%) 11 (65%) 8.00
Non-English 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 7.60
Table 7 Responses to Post-survey questions about facts. Standard deviation is shown for
averages across all participants (in parentheses).
B. Post-survey Questions about Applying Rules
As with the Mid-survey, one question attempts to measure how well the users
applied rules presented in the scenario:
How likely is it that vehicles outside the Lion militia HQ indicate that the
group is planning an attack?
Results are shown in Table 8. The mean answer (and standard deviation)
were 6.91 (1.72), on a scale of 1 (not likely at all) to 10 (very likely). This
is an increase from the Mid-survey (which was 6.75), though not statistically
significant.
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group average likelihood (1-10)
How likely is it that vehicles outside the Lion militia
headquarters indicate that the group is planning an attack?
everyone 6.91 (1.72)
Group I 7.50
Group II 6.86
Group III 6.56
Tech 6.83
Non-Tech 7.00
English 6.47
Non-English 8.40
Table 8 Responses to Post-survey questions about applying rules, ranging from 1 (not
likely at all) to 10 (very likely).
C. Post-survey Questions about Trust
Again, as with the Mid-survey, one question attempts to measure how much
users trust sources of information:
How much do you trust the paid Lion militia informants?
Results are tallied in Table 9. The mean answer (and standard deviation) were
5.36 (1.71), on a scale of 1 (not much at all) to 10 (very much). This is a small
decrease from the Mid-survey (5.69), though not statistically significant. It is
notable, however, that all participants except those from non-English speaking
households lowered their level of trust between the Mid- and Post-surveys.
group average level of trust (1-10)
How much do you trust the paid Lion militia informants?
everyone 5.36 (1.71)
Group I 5.33
Group II 5.71
Group III 5.11
Tech 5.00
Non-Tech 5.80
English 5.29
Non-English 5.60
Table 9 Responses to Post-survey questions about trust, ranging from 1 (not much trust)
to 10 (very much).
D. Post-survey Questions about Conclusions
Two of the multiple-choice questions in Part 1 of the Post-survey ask users to
draw their own intermediate conclusions based on the narrative:
Red leaders have tweeted that they are planning an attack.
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and
Braxian Military should prioritize rescue operations over attacks on rebel
militia.
The answers, tallied in Table 10 indicate that users were unable to draw their
own intermediate conclusions. This is understandable, because relatively little
information pertinent to either question was provided in the narrative text, and
providing a TRUE or FALSE answer to either question would require the user
to make unsubstantiated inferences. This is a positive effect of interacting with
ArgTrust, because users are given the opportunity to modulate the facts and
rules contained in the narrative according to their own beliefs and trust values.
The act of working directly with the content forces users to be careful not to
draw conclusions for which there is no supporting evidence in the scenario.
group TRUE FALSE Inconclusive confidence
Red leaders have tweeted that they are planning an attack.
everyone 0 (0%) 8 (36%) 14 (64%) 8.50 (2.44)
Group I 0 (0%) 2 (33%) 4 (67%) 8.00
Group II 0 (0%) 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 8.57
Group III 0 (0%) 2 (22%) 7 (78%) 8.78
Tech 0 (0%) 4 (33%) 8 (67%) 8.92
Non-Tech 0 (0%) 4 (40%) 6 (60%) 8.00
English 0 (0%) 4 (24%) 13 (76%) 8.71
Non-English 0 (0%) 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 7.80
Braxian Military should prioritize rescue operations over attacks on rebel militia.
everyone 5 (23%) 2 (9%) 15 (68%) 7.45 (1.92)
Group I 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 5 (83%) 7.50
Group II 4 (57%) 1 (14%) 2 (29%) 8.29
Group III 0 (0%) 1 (11%) 8 (89%) 6.78
Tech 2 (17%) 1 (8%) 9 (75%) 7.33
Non-Tech 3 (30%) 1 (10%) 6 (60%) 7.60
English 3 (18%) 2 (12%) 12 (71%) 7.41
Non-English 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 3 (60%) 7.60
Table 10 Responses to Post-survey questions about intermediate conclusions.
Finally, users are asked to draw a conclusion with respect to the overall
predicament posed by the narrative:
You have to decide which rebel militia the Braxian Military efforts should
focus on defending against.
The results are displayed in Table 11. The responses lean heavily toward de-
fending against the Reds militia (82%), though confidence is moderate (6.55).
It is notable that confidence was lower for all groupings of participants and
more sharply lowered by non-technical participants and participants from non-
English speaking homes.
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group Lions Reds confidence
Which rebel group should the Braxian Military provide defense against?
everyone 4 (18%) 18 (82%) 6.55 (1.63)
Group I 2 (33%) 4 (67%) 5.67
Group II 1 (14%) 6 (86%) 7.14
Group III 1 (11%) 8 (89%) 6.67
Tech 1 (8%) 11 (92%) 6.67
Non-Tech 3 (30%) 7 (70%) 6.40
English 2 (12%) 15 (88%) 6.94
Non-English 2 (40%) 3 (60%) 5.20
Table 11 Responses to Post-survey questions about conclusion drawn.
4.3.2 Changes from Mid-survey to Post-survey
This section highlights responses that changed between the Mid-survey and
the Post-survey. Note that because (as mentioned earlier) only participants
in Groups II and III completed the Mid-survey, percentages presented in this
section are computed out of 16 instead of 22.
We report on three types of changes. The first type is the extent to which
users changed their opinions about facts and/or rules presented in the scenario.
The second type is the extent to which users changed their confidence in their
answers. The third type is the extent to which users changed the number of
Inconclusive answers to conclusive answers (i.e., TRUE or FALSE).
With respect to reflecting the facts and/or rules presented in the scenario,
the following changes in opinion were detected:
– In response to questions about whether there are rebel groups in the same
region as the earthquake, two (13%) users changed their opinions from
FALSE to TRUE.
– Half the users (50%) also changed their opinion about how likely is it that
vehicles outside the Lion militia HQ indicate that the group is planning
an attack. The mean (and standard deviation) rose from 6.75 (1.61) to
6.69 (1.62).
– Half of the users (50%) changed how much they trust paid Lion mili-
tia informants, from a mean (and standard deviation) of 5.69 (1.66) to
5.38 (1.45).
– Five (31%) people changed their opinion about which group is most violent
between the Mid-survey and Post-survey, and all changed from Reds to
Lions. However, users’ confidence in their answers to this question declined,
from a mean (and standard deviation) of 7.19 (1.17) to 6.88 (1.59).
The quantitative differences recorded are not statistically significant, nonethe-
less, it is an important result that many users changed their opinions as a
result of interacting with ArgTrust.
With respect to changed levels of confidence, the differences in confidence
levels are shown in Table 12. Averaged across all users who completed both
Mid- and Post-surveys, the confidence level decreased after working with ArgTrust.
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Even considering averages within a number of groupings (Tech majors vs Non-
Tech majors; native English speakers vs non-native English speakers; Groups
II and III), all the averages showed a decline in confidence. When looking at
individuals, the confidence level only increased for 2 out of 16 participants.
Both of these individuals were native English speakers; only one was a Tech
major. This result is unexpected. Again, although the quantitative values are
not statistically significant, nonetheless, it is an important result that users’
confidence levels declined.
group Mid-survey Post-survey change
everyone 8.48 (0.70) 7.81 (0.90) -0.67
Group II 8.57 (0.70) 8.14 (0.78) -0.43
Group III 8.41 (0.72) 7.56 (0.94) -0.86
Tech 8.45 (0.73) 7.82 (0.94) -0.64
Non-Tech 8.57 (0.68) 7.80 (0.91) -0.77
English 8.45 (0.70) 7.72 (0.91) -0.73
Non-English 8.62 (0.81) 8.20 (0.87) -0.42
Table 12 Differences in confidence levels, from Mid-survey to Post-survey. Negative change
means that level of confidence decreased. Only data from participants who completed both
Mid-survey and Post-survey is included.
With respect to changed number of Inconclusive answers to conclusive an-
swers (i.e., TRUE or FALSE), results are shown in Table 13. For all users who
completed both Mid- and Post-surveys, the percentage of multiple choice ques-
tions that were given Inconclusive answers increased between the Mid-survey
and the Post-survey. The same holds true for each sub-group of users (Tech
majors vs Non-Tech majors; from English vs non-English speaking homes).
However, we note that the “Non-English” group was significantly less likely
to provide an INCONCLUSIVE answer. While we cannot draw any statistically
significant conclusions from this observation because our sample size is too
small, we believe this trend warrants further investigation in future studies.
Table 13 Percentage of multiple choice questions that were answered Inconclusive. Pos-
itive change means level of inconclusiveness increased. Only data from participants who
completed both Mid-survey and Post-survey is included.
group Mid-survey Post-survey change
everyone 0.34 ( 0.20) 0.52 ( 0.28) 0.17
Group II 0.10 ( 0.18) 0.16 ( 0.27) 0.05
Group III 0.26 ( 0.24) 0.38 ( 0.35) 0.13
Tech 0.27 ( 0.24) 0.41 ( 0.35) 0.14
Non-Tech 0.19 ( 0.19) 0.29 ( 0.29) 0.10
English 0.34 ( 0.20) 0.52 ( 0.29) 0.17
Non-English 0.02 ( 0.08) 0.03 ( 0.12) 0.01
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4.3.3 Post-survey, Part 2
Table 14 lists the fifteen questions contained in Part 2 of the Post-survey that
aim to assess users’ impressions of ArgTrust; Table 15 contains the responses.
These questions are adapted from the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) [26,
27]. Figure 7 plots the mean and standard deviation computed across all 22
participants in the study. The bars labelled (a)–(r) correspond to the questions
listed in Tables 14 and 15. Discussion follows.
(a) How difficult was the scenario to understand?
(b) How well would you say you understood the scenario BEFORE using ArgTrust?
(c) How well would you say you understood the scenario AFTER using ArgTrust?
(d) How much did the ArgTrust software help to visualize the scenario?
(e) How mentally demanding was the scenario BEFORE using ArgTrust?
(f) How mentally demanding was the scenario AFTER using ArgTrust?
(g) How hard was it to make a decision?
(h) How much did the ArgTrust software help with your decision making?
(j) Did you think the ArgTrust system easy to use?
(k) Overall, how helpful did you find the ArgTrust system?
(m) How physically demanding was the session?
(n) How hurried or rushed was the pace of the session?
(p) How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do?
(q) How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance?
(r) How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you?
Table 14 Post-survey questions assessing users’ impressions of ArgTrust
Table 16 lists the average changes in understanding and mental demand,
respectively, as perceived by users before and after interacting with ArgTrust.
Overall, the mean is positive in both cases, indicating that both level of under-
standing and mental demand increased as a result of using ArgTrust. However,
the high standard deviations of both values render the results inconclusive. Fig-
ure 8 plots the changes for each individual who participated in the study. The
values are sorted in ascending order, to preserve the anonymity of participants.
These plots illustrate that the understanding increased for most users. Only
2 participants reported large decreases in understanding as a result of using
ArgTrust, and both of these were in the Non-Technical group. Approximately
a third of participants reported increase in mental demand as a result of using
ArgTrust, though this is understandable because everyone was new to using
the software and it is expected that they would have to think harder when
using new software (versus not using it).
The second part of the Post-survey also posed the question:
Did you know anything about logical argumentation before participating in
this study?
which is essentially the same as the following question posed in the Pre-survey:
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group (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
everyone 4.68 7.45 7.59 5.36 5.05 5.36 6.36 5.18
(2.25) (1.84) (1.89) (2.15) (2.50) (2.11) (2.42) (2.56)
Group I 3.83 7.83 7.00 4.00 5.17 7.00 7.33 4.67
Group II 5.00 7.86 8.57 6.29 5.43 5.00 5.14 6.14
Group III 5.00 6.89 7.22 5.56 4.67 4.56 6.67 4.78
Tech 5.42 7.25 7.75 5.50 4.75 4.83 6.42 4.92
Non-Tech 3.80 7.70 7.40 5.20 5.40 6.00 6.30 5.50
English 4.65 7.47 7.24 5.29 5.18 5.35 6.53 5.06
Non-English 4.80 7.40 8.80 5.60 4.60 5.40 5.80 5.60
group (j) (k) (m) (n) (p) (q) (r)
everyone 6.50 5.23 2.50 3.05 4.05 4.86 3.59
(2.69) (2.41) (2.18) (1.94) (2.44) (2.17) (2.65)
Group I 5.50 4.17 4.67 2.67 4.50 5.33 6.33
Group II 6.00 6.29 1.71 1.86 3.00 5.29 1.71
Group III 7.56 5.11 1.67 4.22 4.56 4.22 3.22
Tech 6.58 5.33 1.83 3.75 4.50 4.92 2.92
Non-Tech 6.40 5.10 3.30 2.20 3.50 4.80 4.40
English 6.82 4.94 2.18 3.29 4.12 4.71 3.47
Non-English 5.40 6.20 3.60 2.20 3.80 5.40 4.00
Table 15 Tallies of Post-survey questions assessing users’ impressions of ArgTrust. Re-
sponses were given on a scale of 1 (least) to 10 (most).
group understanding mental demand
everyone 0.14 ( 2.01) 0.32 ( 2.10)
Group I -0.83 ( 3.31) 1.83 ( 2.71)
Group II 0.71 ( 0.95) -0.43 ( 1.99)
Group III 0.33 ( 1.41) -0.11 ( 1.27)
Tech 0.50 ( 1.31) 0.08 ( 1.56)
Non-Tech -0.30 ( 2.63) 0.60 ( 2.67)
English -0.24 ( 2.11) 0.18 ( 2.13)
Non-English 1.40 ( 0.89) 0.80 ( 2.17)
Table 16 Post-survey responses: average self-reported changes in understanding and mental
demand
Did you know anything about “logical argumentation” or “argumentation
graphs” before today?
Table 17 shows the results from both surveys. It is interesting to note that the
number of “yes” responses to questions about knowledge of logical argumen-
tation prior to the study increased from the Pre-survey to the Post-survey. In
fact, 5 people changed their answer from “no” to “yes” and 2 people changed
their answer from “yes” to “no”. Unfortunately, none of the participants who
changed their answer provided any explanation in their comments for why
their answer changed. We speculate that the people who changed their answer
from “no” to “yes” found that they knew about the concept but were unfamil-
iar with the term “logical argumentation”, and that the people who changed
their answer from “yes” to “no” found that the concept they thought of as
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Fig. 7 Answers to Post-survey assessment questions. The key to the bar labels (a-r) is listed
in Table 14.
“logical argumentation” was not aligned with the concept as presented in the
study.
Pre-survey Post-survey
group yes no yes no
Did you know anything about logical argumentation before participating in this study?
everyone 2 (9%) 20 (91%) 5 (23%) 17 (77%)
Group I 0 (0%) 6 (100%) 1 (17%) 5 (83%)
Group II 1 (14%) 6 (86%) 1 (14%) 6 (86%)
Group III 1 (11%) 8 (89%) 3 (33%) 6 (67%)
Tech 2 (17%) 10 (83%) 3 (25%) 9 (75%)
Non-Tech 0 (0%) 10 (100%) 2 (20%) 8 (80%)
English 1 (6%) 16 (94%) 5 (29%) 12 (71%)
Non-English 1 (20%) 4 (80%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%)
Table 17 Changes from Pre-survey to Post-survey with respect to prior knowledge of ar-
gumentation.
Finally, the Post-survey ends with a free-form comments question, asking
users to provide feedback. Table 18 contains some of the free-form comments
entered. Though the comments also contain some negative sentiments, we be-
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Fig. 8 Post-survey responses: individual self-reported changes in understanding and mental
demand. Values are sorted numerically, to preserve anonymity of individuals. Positive values
indicate increases from “before” to “after”.
lieve that these indicate that some users understand the benefits of structuring
decisions in the way that we do in ArgTrust.
Table 18 Comments from participants
– The tool is successful in representing the factors that go into making a decision and
displaying the relationships between those facts and how the influence a decision.
– It somewhat helped filter out the information that is not necessarily true.
– It helped me break the component information down a little bit but I had already
created an outline of my own that helped me just as much if not more. Seeing the
beliefs and the trust broken down was helpful, though.
– It helped to tell me what I’m supposed to think. . . how much I’m supposed to trust
people, and how I was supposed to interpret the statements in the given scenario.
However, it bothered me that a tool was telling me how to simplify a complex
problem, since I don’t believe the tool can possibly take all the details and subtleties
into account. but if I accept that a complex situation can and must be simplified,
then yes, the tool is helpful as a place to plug in parameters and let it do the math.
– By breaking down the situation into smaller bits and displaying how much you
believe each situation to be true, it was much easier to make decisions because I
was considering the situation asked only, not the entire situation.
– When I put how I felt into numbers, it organized and simplified my concerns and
weighed all of the factors into the equation for me. It made it easier to see the
results.
4.4 Analysis
In analysing the data, there are a number of interesting observations to make.
There was no correlation found between participants’ level of education or
most other Pre-survey demographics to any of the Mid-survey or Post-survey
responses. The factors that did correlate are academic major, split between
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Tech and Non-Tech majors, and native language, split between native English
speakers and non-native English speakers. The results are analysed below.
First, we look at the extent to which working with ArgTrust caused users
to change their minds.
– After using ArgTrust, users expressed less trust in paid Lion militia infor-
mants.
– After using ArgTrust, users believed that an attack by the Lion rebel group
was less likely.
– After using ArgTrust, most users believed that the Reds rebel group was the
most violent.
Each of these findings confirms our working hypothesis that ArgTrust will
have impact on users’ decision-making processes.
Next, we look at differences in users’ responses to the fifteen questions in
Post-survey Part 2, which aim to measure users’ perceptions about the ef-
fectiveness of interacting with ArgTrust. While Figure 7 shows the aggregate
data across all users, Figures 9, 10 and 11 illustrate the results by looking
at the users divided into different groupings. While there are no statistically
significant quantitative differences, there are some interesting qualitative ob-
servations that seem important.
Specifically, we discuss users’ perceived differences between understanding
and mental demand before and after working with ArgTrust. The most distinct
differences can be seen in Figure 9, bars s and t, respectively.
– With respect to understanding, the score for Group II participants rose
from 7.86 to 8.57 and the score for Group III participants rose from 6.89
to 7.22. However, Group I reported a decrease in understanding from 7.83
to 7.00. Scores were reported on a scale of 1 (Very poor) to 10 (Very well).
If we look at the numbers of participants reporting an increase/decrease
in understanding rather than the average scores, we find that 3 people
in Group I reported better understanding and 2 reported worse under-
standing, 3 people in Group II reported better understanding and none
reported worse understanding, and 3 people in Group III reported better
understanding and 2 reported worse understanding. Overall, that makes
9 reporting better understanding and 7 reporting worse understanding.
Examining the groupings according to Tech majors vs Non-Tech majors,
the score went up for Tech majors, but went down slightly for Non-Tech
majors.
Examining the groupings according to native English speakers vs non-
native English speakers, there is a much greater increase in score for non-
native English speakers. difference in users’ perceived understanding after
working with ArgTrust (c).
– With respect to mental demand, the results were more mixed. Groups II
and III both showed a decrease in difficulty from pre-software to post-
software (5.43 to 5.00 and 4.67 to 4.56, respectively). Group I, however,
showed a large rise in difficulty (5.17 to 7.00). Scores were reported on a
scale of 1 (Not demanding at all) to 10 (Very demanding).
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If we again look at numbers of participants reporting, we find that 1 person
from Group I reports the task is less demanding with the software and 4
report it is more demanding, and the figures for Group II and Group III
are 4 (less demanding) and 2 (more) and 2 (less) and 2 (more) respectively.
Thus, overall, we have 7 reporting it is less demanding and 8 reporting it is
more demanding; amongst participants with technical backgrounds, more
(6) reported that the task was less demanding when using the ArgTrust
software than those who reported the task was more demanding (4).
Next, we examine users’ perceived level of frustration when interacting
with ArgTrust. Users were asked How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed,
and annoyed were you? in the Post-survey, with responses ranging from 1 (Not
annoyed or stressed at all) to 10 (Very annoyed and stressed). The average
score for Group II was 1.71, and for Group III the score was 3.22. However,
for Group I, the score was significantly higher: 6.33.
Other observations include:
– Group I users did not find the software helpful with respect to visualizing
the scenario, as compared to Group II and III users (d).
– Group II found it much easier to make decisions than Group I and III
users (g).
– Group III found the ArgTrust system easier to use than Group I and II
users (j), while native English speakers found it easier to use than non-
native English speakers.
– Non-native English speakers found the system more helpful overall (k).
– For some unknown reason, Group I users found it physically demanding (m)
to use the system, which may tie in with their high level of frustration.
Otherwise, there was no difference in how the study was implemented;
there was no physical element in the study.
– Tech majors felt that they were more rushed or hurried than Non-Tech
majors (n).
– Tech majors felt that they were more successful than Non-Tech majors (p).
In summary, the results of the user study provide evidence that partici-
pants who are presented with argumentation-based support for making deci-
sions found that interacting with ArgTrust helped their understanding (both
directly reported and inferred from the changes made in their decisions), al-
beit at the cost of increased difficulty in reaching a decision and decreased
confidence in their decisions. Nonetheless, users were more able to make deci-
sions after interacting with ArgTrust. Factors that seem to have an impact on
users’ experience include whether they are native English speakers or not, and
whether they majored in Technical subjects as undergraduates or not. Other
demographic factors (gender, age, ethnicity, level of education) did not play a
part.
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Fig. 9 Groups I, II and III. The key to the bar labels (a-r) is listed in Table 14.
5 Related work
There are four main areas of work that are related to the results reported here:
modelling trust; reasoning about trust using argumentation; argumentation-
based decision making; and the argumentation in interaction between humans
and agents. We briefly cover each of these below stating the differences with
our work.
5.1 Modelling trust
As computer systems have become increasingly distributed, and control of
those systems has become more decentralised, computational approaches to
trust have become steadily more important [23]. Some of this work has directly
been driven by changes in technology, for example considering the trustwor-
thiness of nodes in peer-to-peer networks [1, 15, 32], or dealing with wireless
networks [22, 34, 65]. Other research has been driven by changes in the way
that technology is used, especially involving the Internet. One early challenge
is related to the establishment of trust in e-commerce [47, 62, 79], and the use
of reputation systems to enable this trust [36, 37]. Another issue is the problem
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of deciding which of several competing sources of conflicting information one
should trust [2, 11].
Additional issues have arisen with the development of the social web, for
example, the questions of how social media can be manipulated [41, 42] and
how one should revise one’s notions of trust based on the past actions of
individuals [25]. In this area is some of the work that is most relevant for
that we describe here, work that investigates how trust should be propagated
through networks of individuals [24, 29, 35, 78], and we have drawn on this in
our implementation of ArgTrust.
In all of this work, the focus is on the computation of the right numerical
trust value to assign to individuals, and is often concerned with showing that
the approach advanced in the paper is better than some other approach. In
contrast, our work is concerned with how the values computed by these meth-
ods can be used in combination with argumentation, and ArgTrust provides a
choice of ways of computing trust measures drawn from existing models.
5.2 Reasoning about trust using argumentation
The second area of work to consider is that which looks at the use of argumen-
tation to handle trust. While the literature on trust is considerable, prior work
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on argumentation and trust is much more sparse. Existing work includes the
application of argumentation techniques to networks of trust and distrust [28];
the combination of argumentation with fuzzy trust measures [64], with statis-
tical data [44] and with subjective logic [49] (used in [29] to handle trust); the
use of metalevel argumentation to describe trust [73]; and the description of a
set of argument schemes for deriving trust [50]. However, none of this covers
the same ground as the work reported here which is not concerned with the
detail of how argumentation about trust is carried out, but how the results of
the argumentation process is used by humans.
5.3 Argumentation-based decision making
The third area of work to consider is that on argumentation-based decision
making. Here the work by Fox and colleagues [14, 17] showed that constructing
arguments for and against a decision option, and then simply combining these
arguments8 could provide a decision mechanism that rivalled the accuracy of
probabilistic models. This basic method was extended in [18, 51] to create a
symbolic mechanism that, like classical decision theory, distinguished between
8 Even the very straightforward mechanism of counting arguments for and against.
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belief in propositions and the values of decision outcomes, while [30] showed
the usefulness of arguments in communicating evidence for decision options
to human users. More recent work on argumentation and decision making is
described in [31, 71].
The relationship that we consider between argumentation and decision-
making is different from all of this work. All the above work tries to build
argumentation systems that identify the best decision to take. Even [30], which
of the work in this area is closest to what we are doing, tries to identify the best
decision and explain it to a human user in terms the human can understand.
In work that evaluates the effectiveness of the systems, the aim is to show
that the system gets the decisions right [14, 77]. Our focus, in contrast, is just
to present information and test whether the users find the information to be
useful—whether it helps them to feel more comfortable with their decisions,
and whether they alter their opinion as a result of being able to use ArgTrust
to visualise and manipulate the information on which they base their decisions.
5.4 Argumentation for human-agent interaction
A number of authors have examined whether software that presents arguments
to users can help their argumentation skills. Work on assessing the impact of
software that diagrams arguments has been carried out for several of the better
known tools for visualizing arguments. For example, [10] tests the use of the
Questmap system in teaching legal argumentation; [66] describes formative
evaluation of the Belvedere system to support students in scientific argumen-
tation; [33] examines the use of the TC3 tool to help in collaborative argu-
mentation in the pursuit of a writing task; and [63] summarises an experiment
to assess whether the “reasoner’s workbench” Convince Me helps students,
again in the area of scientific reasoning. All these papers find some support for
the usefulness of the software, but this line of work also includes [72], which
provides a sharp critique of much of the work listed above. Also noteworthy
is [13], which investigates argument mapping—on paper, rather than using
software—as a means for improving understanding of text, and finds that the
presentation of arguments improves comprehension and recall.
Another line of related work is that which assesses whether human reason-
ing matches that captured in formal argumentation. While work such as [74],
which looks at reasoning with defaults, is somewhat related, the only work we
know of that explicitly examines the differences between argumentation theory
and human reasoning is [60]. This paper looks at the question of reinstatement.
Argumentation theory says that if an argument A is attacked by an argument
B and that is all we know then A is out and B is in. However, if B is then
attacked by C, A and C are in and B is out—A is reinstated by the attack
that C makes on B. After reinstatement, the theory says that A is as strongly
held as it was before any attack by B. The study in [60] reveals that while the
human subjects understood that A should be reinstated by the attack from C
on B—so they agreed with the general pattern of reinstatement—they did not
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agree that A was held with the same force that it was held before the attack
from B.
Of the work in this final area, [13] is the closest to ours, though differs
in its normative focus—it is concerned with whether the students better un-
derstand and recall information when it is presented to them using argument
diagramming—whereas our work is concerned with how users feel about deci-
sions reached when using argumentation as opposed to decisions reached given
only text.
6 Summary
We have described ArgTrust, an interactive application designed to help users
balance information from multiple sources and draw conclusions from that
information, using logical argumentation and a computational model of trust
in information sources. The underlying inference engine is an implementation
of earlier work with ArgTrust, here developed using a mysql and Python
back-end and a web-based front-end, largely written in php and html/css.
This allows more flexibility with scenario input and the ability to transition
to dynamic scenarios, one of the next steps with this research. As well, this
architecture offers more options for user interface development.
The main contribution of this paper is the presentation and in-depth anal-
ysis of a user study, conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of ArgTrust in
helping human users to make decisions. Users were presented with an am-
biguous and complex scenario and instructed to formulate an evidence-backed
recommendation for an action to take, based on information provided in the
scenario. Participants completed Pre-, Mid- and Post-surveys that provided
data about their backgrounds (demographics), and their understanding of the
scenario before and after interacting with ArgTrust.
The results demonstrate, most importantly, that ArgTrust helped users
consider their decisions more carefully. Analysis of the results provided other
qualitative observations: differences in users’ experiences with the application,
with respect to difficulty understanding the scenario and effort expended in
making decisions, were more closely aligned to the language users speak at
home (English or not) and users’ undergraduate majors (Technical or not),
versus other demographic factors. An unexpected result is that users’ ques-
tioned their answers more, after working with ArgTrust, indicated by their
level of confidence in answers declining after using the application.
Future work involves extending the software to handle dynamic scenarios,
applying the methodology to additional domains and testing with a wider
range of users.
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